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Abstract 
Corruption is like an epidemic that has the power to destroy a country’s socioeconomic, financial, 
human and political environment. It has severe consequences in developing countries. This study 
has examined the impact of existing human, political, financial and economic factors on corruption 
for a set of panel countries. The data from 1995 to 2004 is used to serve this purpose. For examining 
the stationarity of the variables, Levin- Lin-Chu (2002), Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests are 
applied. Pedroni Residual based Co-integration and FMOLS by Phillips and Hansen (1990) test 
has been used for examining the co-integration among the variables of the model. The speed of 
adjustment and short-run relationship has been tested through VECM. The estimated results show 
that exports, GDP per capita and political stability have a negative impact on corruption, whereas 
imports, financial development, human development index, bureaucracy, democracy and the rule 
of law have a positive relationship with corruption. The simplified procedures of import and export 
will help in reducing the practice of bribes and corruption. The governments should take the 
necessary steps not only to increase the income, but also to improve the people’s standard of living. 
There should be improvements in the political system. Democracy is also helpful to get rid of 
corruption.  
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I.  Introduction 
Corruption has developed into a global issue triggered by many structural and institutional factors 
such as the nature of the political system, the sociocultural background, the low salaries, the low 
risk of detection and the punishment (Lu, 2000; Quah 2002). In the simplest form, corruption can 
be defined as the use of power for personal benefits such as stealing public funds, bribes for 
procurement of public services and the sale of public assets by government officers without proper 
procedures. An act of corruption can be characterized by the value of the transaction concerned. 
Although this is a continuous variable, the analytical distinction usually made is between a low 
value (“petty”) and a large value (“grand”) corruption. Typically, the larger the value of the corrupt 
transaction, the higher the position in the public hierarchy of the public official(s) involved [Goel 
and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (1999), Svensson (2005)]. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
highlight the different forms and capacities of corruption. Corruption exists in all types of societies 
irrespective of different socioeconomic and cultural history. It occurs everywhere, even though the 
amount / size varies from a person or a nation to another. Mostly, the developing countries that are 
subject to a low level of transparency and accountability, defective judicial and legislative system, 
faulty organizational structure and rent seeking movements are trapped in the clutches of 
corruption. Moreover, it exacts many economic and social costs, and distorts the composition of 
government spending at the expense of health and education sectors. It also steers resource 
allocation towards unproductive direction. Further, it discourages the entry of FDI, and thus harms 
the economic growth (Tanzi 2002, De Vaal and Ebben, 2011). Corruption can be considered as 
the oil that greases the economic growth engine (Anoruo and Braha, 2005), however, it is broadly 
perceived that the disadvantages of corruption are far outweighed compared to its advantages. 
 
Economic growth is a process that influences the economic well-being of a community. Corruption 
implements a major threat to economic growth: the public and private sector efficiency is reduced 
when it enables people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability. The 
current literature lacks of theoretical underpinning that incorporates the potential effects of 
corruption on aggregate output through its impact on the arguments of the production function 
(Kaufman 1998; Shleifer, 1998; Ackerman 1999; Vittal 1999; Chafuen 2000; Mo 2001; Alesina 
and Angeletos 2002). Foreign flows are frequently connected with hefty and lucrative projects or 
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often with denationalization of companies that are good prospects of rent extraction due to a large 
amount of rent involved and the investor can transfer the cost burden towards customers. Hines 
(1995) proves that US investors differ from others in preferring to locate their FDI in less corrupt 
countries after 1977. Undemocratic countries are more prone to corruption (LaPalombara, 1994) 
as public resources are weakly supervised and officers are interested in using them to appeal to 
foreign investment. Countries enjoying a longer period of democracy along with free media, 
unrestricted electoral process, voice freedom, and more importantly, political opposition are the 
key elements to deter corruption. Open societies do not only import goods, but they also import 
their customs, standards and knowledge (Treisman, 2000 and Sandholtz and Gray 2003). 
 
Corruption is a prevalent irrespective of development, every country has to face a specific level of 
corruption. This study is going to answer a few questions. What are the main factors that determine 
corruption in the case of developed and developing countries? How has the development process 
more or less played a role in spreading malfunctioned activities, whether on systemic or individual 
basis? Despite the increasing economic growth, why is a large segment of the population deprived 
of the basic facilities of life like education and health, in developing countries, and how are the 
resources in these countries bound in the hands of a tiny portion of the population? Is this a 
corruption phenomenon?  
 
II. Literature Review 
In the existing literature of economics, corruption is globally considered to be growth inhibitor. 
The existing studies consider it a complex phenomenon because its consequences are more deep-
seated problems of distortion, institutional incentives and governance. There is a number of studies 
that highlight the causes and consequences of corruption and the most reverent are taken here as a 
literature review. Huntington (1968) mentions that corruption aids the economy, particularly in the 
case of cumbersome regulation, excessive bureaucracy, market restriction or inefficient policies. 
The resulting waiting costs would be effectively reduced if the payment of speed money could 
induce bureaucrats to increase their efforts. Ironically, however, corrupt officials might, instead of 
speeding up, actually cause administrative delays in order to attract more bribes. Lui (1985) 
demonstrates the efficiency enhancing the role of corruption via a queuing model and concludes 
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that the size of the economic agents’ bribe reflects their opportunity cost, thereby allowing “better” 
firms to purchase less red tape.  
 
Ades and Tella (1999) elaborate that strategies for making more competitive markets affect 
corruption. The low level of rivalry is translated into more rents extracted by a large number of 
bureaucrats from companies they regulated. There is more corruption in countries enjoying more 
economic rent, where local companies are protected from external competition or with restrictive 
trade and where the number of companies is minor. Opportunities for corruption can be squeezed 
if the external rivalry exists. Indeed, it creates a negative relation between the size of the trade and 
the corruption. When the tax and the tariff barriers reduce imports, inward oriented strategies 
increase corruption. This is the foreign rivalry consequences. Limit the trade and financial streams, 
generate ample chances for the private managers and officers to indulge in corrupt attempts where 
bribes and payoffs can be offered to get beneficial treatments. This is called “direct policy impact”. 
Bonaglia et al., (2001) argue that openness to trade restrain corruption. The mechanism includes 
trade policy, foreign rivalry, foreign investors and variations in cost-benefit relationship that is 
confronted with a country when constructing high-quality organizations to combat corruption. 
Trade relaxation and financial streams can alter the cost-benefit relationship in corruption. Goel 
and Korhonen (2011) have discussed the relationship between exports and corruption by using 
disaggregated statistics of exports covering a large number of countries. It is statistically analyzed 
that trade of fuel constantly impacts the corruption level, whereas trade in manufacturing material 
and iron doesn’t. Growing countries along economic freedom and political liberalization and larger 
state scope have a reduced corruption level. 
 
Haque and Kneller (2004) demonstrate that corruption is widespread, particularly in developing 
countries, especially in the venture relating to the public sector as government officers are given 
the responsibility of securing public assets being used in the production of creative inputs. Because 
the information is lopsided, between the bureaucracy and government, the bureaucracy may give 
a misleading report that procure best quality products at high cost, while delivering products with 
low quality, consuming low cost. This result is the shape of severe impacts on the efficiency of the 
economy and thus lessening the growth. Corruption reduces the worth of public amenities, 
necessary for production and increases the government expenditures above the efficient level.  
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You and Khagram, (2005) analyze that people with higher incomes are more inclined toward 
corrupt activities, whereas individuals bearing lower income levels are incapable to fight with 
corruption as they don’t have enough resources even they are persuaded to do so. But with the rise 
in income inequality, people with lower incomes become vulnerable to payoffs in order to have an 
approach for several state amenities. Uslaner (2006) explains that unequal income distribution is 
a reason of increasing corruption and resultantly increased corruption enhances income disparity. 
Apergis et al., (2010) prove that rising GDP per capita has an adverse impact on corruption and 
income disparity. Economic development is the best solution to decrease corruption and income 
inequality. 
 
Eicher et al., (2006) have exhibited the bilateral relationship between corruption and education. 
Corruption cut revenues that impede the process of educational accomplishment. Subsequently, 
chances of corruption increase as with less education people or voters are unable to recognize 
corrupt candidates and vote for such as a politician. Blackburn and Sarmah (2007) evaluate the 
connection of economic growth, corruption and life expectancy. Improved life expectancy is 
connected with development as life expectancy, economic sovereignty and higher national 
incomes can possibly discourage corruption.  
 
Mocan (2008) argues that corruption is a consequence of impersonal association between 
bureaucracy and general public in cities. It permits them to use their positions and take more bribes, 
as more bureaucrats are appointed in cities. Due to a larger population and heavy public funds, 
they can grab resources easily. Though, it is feasible that corruption can be higher in areas with 
lesser population because of lower civil competition and more chances of retaining office in spite 
of any suspicious matter. Gillette (2008) has demonstrated that minor bureaucracy is strongly 
connected with corruption as compared to major bureaucracy. Because where there are more 
bureaucrats, it can be found, how they exercise their obligations without taking payoffs. So 
undermanned and incompetent staff can be more suspicion as less is the number of bureaucrats 
who can demand heavy kickbacks to perform their responsibilities. Reduced number of 
bureaucratic staff can be a cause of increasing corruption due to its relaxed involvement, rarer 
substitutes for amenities, or lessened productivity of state authorities. Therefore, though 
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bureaucrats are penalized for their rent-seeking behavior, the right way is to raise the number of 
these reviled officers. 
 
III. Economic Methodology 
Alam (1989) refutes the pro-efficiency argument for corruption by contending that because bribery 
is illegal, bureaucrats will regulate entry into the bidding process to only those who can trust. Since 
trust is not a proxy for efficiency, there is no reason to believe that the highest bidder will 
necessarily be most efficient, although the body of theoretical and empirical research that 
addresses the problem of corruption is still growing (Klitgaard 1987; Kaufman 1998; Shleifer, 
1998; Ades and Tella 1999; Vittal 1999; Chafuen 2000; Treisman 2000; Wei 2000; Alesina and 
Angeletos 2002; Johnston 2005; Altunbas and Thornton 2011; Ali 2015). Following the previous 
methodologies, the functional form of this study become as:  
                                                     
 C    =    f (ED, FD, HD, PD) 
Where,  
C = Corruption 
ED = Economic Development  
FD = Financial Development  
HD = Human Development 
PD = Political Development 
The equation can be written as: 
 
(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓( 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝐿𝑊𝑖𝑡) 
 
Here 
CPI = Corruption Perception Index 
EXP = Exports of Goods and Services as % of GDP 
GDPpc = Gross Domestic Product per Capita in LUC 
IMP = Imports of Goods and Services as % of GDP 
DCP = Domestic Credit to Private Sector as % of GDP 
HDI = Human Development Index 
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BUR = Bureaucracy 
DEMO = Democracy 
POLSTB = Political Stability 
RLW = Rule of Law 
The econometric model of this study become as:  
 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 =    𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽3𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽4𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽5𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽6𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽7𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽9𝑅𝐿𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 
In the above mentioned equation i = 1, ……, 31 in case of developed panel and i = 1, …….., 49 
in case of developing panel, whereas T= 1,………., 20 in both cases. 
 
Abuse of power implicates effecting a legal standard. The sale of public assets by government 
officers, bribes for procurement of public services and stealing public funds is called corruption 
and in this study, it is measured by: Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International (TI) is used in this study, TI is a Berlin based non-governmental association that 
publishes the annual CPI of countries, CPI is a "poll of polls" representing ideas of business people, 
risk forecasters and indigenous population that has been surveyed CPI is intentionally choosier 
about the choice of indices used in the aggregation. 80 countries have been selected for analysis, 
dividing all into 31 developed and 49 developing nations. Developed and developing panels have 
been selected based on income level as per World Development Indicators Database classification. 
For Economic and Financial Development, data on Exports, Gaps, Imports and Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector has been taken from WDI database. For Human Development, data on HDI has 
been extracted from United Nations Development Programmer’s database. For Political 
Development, data on bureaucracy, democracy, political stability and rule of law has been obtained 
from the WGI database as exercised. WGI is produced by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay. 
  
IV. Econometric Methodology 
This study is going to check the effects of Development on Corruption. To check stationarity of 
variables, this study has applied the panel unit root test as it is more powerful than time series unit 
root tests. Three main tests are being employed for this purpose. 
• Levin- Lin- Chu (2002) 
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• Maddala & Wu (1999) Fisher-ADF 
• Choi (2001) Fisher-PP 
 
V. Results and Discussion 
To investigate the impacts of Development (Economic, Financial, Human and Political) on 
corruption, this study has applied most relevant econometric techniques. The variables include 
corruption Perception Index for Corruption, Human Development Index for Human Development, 
Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP for Financial Development, Gross Domestic 
Product per Capita in LCU, Exports of Goods and Services as a share of GDP, imports of goods 
and services as a share of GDP for Economic Development. Moreover, Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
Political Stability and Rule of Law are taken as a proxy for Political Development. The 20 years’ 
time period covered in this study extends from 1995-2014 including 31 developed and 49 
developing countries. The developed set of countries includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, Czech, Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherland, Poland, Portugal, Russian, Federation, 
Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. 
The developing countries comprises of Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Cost Rice, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, EI-Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Thailand Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zambia. To find out unit 
root in the current study, Levin- Lin- Chu (2000) approach has been replicated. Co-integration 
among variables is tested through Pedroni Residual Based Co-integration test (1999, 2004). For 
the short run association between Development and Corruption VECM is applied. To review the 
significance of coefficients FMOLS is applied.  
 
Table 1 shows the results of Levin-Lin- Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Choi 
(2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, but when all variables are converted into 1st 
difference, they become stationary. The Order of Integration of all variables is same. The table 2 
shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999, 2004). The 
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results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-Statistic, Panel ADF-Statistics, Group PP-Statistics, 
and Group ADF-Statistics) are statistically significant. The study found long-run relationship 
between variables. Table 3 shows the results of Panel FMOLS (Fully Modified Ordinary Least 
Square). Coefficient values indicate long-run coefficients. EXP has negative signed so, one-unit 
increase in EXP drop the Corruption by 0.0753 units. The other two coefficients have positive 
values indicating an upsurge independent variable. One-unit increase in GDPpc and IMF push the 
Corruption by 0.0001 and 0.1691 units respectively. GDPpc pores a very slight impact on 
corruption level. As developed countries, mostly trade in oil and industrial products are available 
in abundance there, so a rise in exports drops the corruption and they import agricultural products 
the most which they cannot grow easily so imports grow up the corruption with slight difference 
in these countries. The table 4 shows the t-statistics, Coefficient and p-values of ECT (Error 
Correction Term). As the coefficient is negative, so the study pledges the presence of a short-run 
association between CPI-EXP and CPI-IMP. A negative sign of coefficient also shows 
convergence towards equilibrium. EXP and IMP converge towards CPI at the speed of 2.65% and 
2.67% annually. Coefficient of GDPpc has a negative sign indicating convergence towards 
equilibrium at the speed of 0.02% annually.  
 
Table 5 shows the t-statistics and p-values are given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type 
tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, but 
both variables are stationary at I(1). The table 6 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-
integration test given by Pedroni (1999, 2004). The results of five out of seven methods (Panel p-
statistic, Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADF-statistics, Group PP-statistics, Group ADF- statistics) are 
statistically significant. Table 7 shows the results of Panel FMOLS (Full Modifies Ordinary Least 
Square). The coefficient value indicates long-run coefficient. P-value is statistically significant. 1-
unit increase in DCP reveals a gain in Corruption index of 0.0714 units. Borrowers of private 
sector practically use the credit for their own best interest and try to get more credit in any way so 
that they can earn more and more on it, so more credit often induce more corruption. The table 8 
shows the t-statistics, Coefficient and the p-values of ECT (Error Correction Term). DCP 
converges (get back) towards CPI at the speed of 0.725 annually as the data included is on an 
annual basis. But the p-value is statistically insignificant showing no short-run relationship 
between both variables. 
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Table 9 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level, but at 1st 
difference they are stationary. The table 10 shows the results of residual based Panel Co-integration 
test given by Pedroni (1999, 2004). Results of the seven methods are statistically significant. So, 
the study found long-run relationship between variables. Table 11 shows results of Panel FMOLS 
(Full Modified Ordinary Least Square). The coefficient value indicates long-run coefficient. P-
values are statistically significant. One-unit increase in HDI shows an increase in Corruption index 
of 7.8162 units. When people are richer and educated, they will be more aware of their fundamental 
rights, so to get their rights they will indulge in corrupt activities if they are unable to get their 
works done easily. The table 12 shows the t-statistics, Coefficient and the p-values of ECT (Error 
Correction Term). A positive sign of the coefficient indicates divergence of HDI towards 
equilibrium.  
 
Table 13 shows the t-statistics and p-value given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are non-stationary at level. But when 
all variables are converted into 1st difference, they become stationary. Table 15 shows results of 
Panel FMOLS (Full Modified Ordinary Least Square). The coefficient value indicates long-run 
coefficient. These variables affect corruption significantly. One-unit increase in BUR, DEMO, and 
RLW push the corruption up by 1.6136, 2.6533 and 0.6874 units respectively. Longer tenure of 
bureaucracy often results in corrupt activities. In a more democratic nations where media open all 
secrets and rules are strict to be implemented, some hidden corruption rise to get personal benefits. 
The table 16 shows the t-statistics, coefficient and the p-values of ECT (Error Correction Term). 
The study concludes the presence of a short-run relationship between CPI-BUR, CPI-DEMO, CPI-
POLSTB and CPI-RLW. A negative sign of coefficients shows convergence towards equilibrium. 
BUR converges towards CPI at the speed of 9.88% annually. 
• DEMO converges towards CPI at the speed of 3.33% annually. 
• POLSTAB converges towards CPI at the speed of 3.98%.  
• RLW converges towards CPI at the speed of 7.46% annually. 
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Table 17 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type tests 
by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). The results show that all variables are stationary at 
first difference. The table 18 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given 
by Pedroni (1999. 2004). The results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-statistic, Panel ADF-
Statistic, Group PP-Statistic, and Group ADF- statistic) are statistically significant. The study 
found long-run relationship between variables. Table 19 shows the results of Panel FMOLS (Full 
Modified Ordinary Least Square), Coefficient values indicate long-run coefficients. All 
coefficients have positive values indicating an escalation independent variable. One-unit increase 
in EXP effect corruption by 0.0278 units positively and one-unit upward trend in GDPpc and IMP 
push the corruption up by 0.0001 and 0.0549 units respectively. GDPpc leaves a very slight impact 
on Corruption level. The nations in this panel are mostly imported industrial products and export 
agriculture commodities so imports are more prone to corruption as compared to exports. Income 
inequality results in more corruption as compared to GDPpc itself. The table 20 shows the 
coefficient and the p-values of ECT (Error Correction Term). A negative sign of coefficient also 
shows convergence towards equilibrium. 
• 4.41% annual convergence of EXP towards CPI 
• 4.6% annual convergence of IMP towards CPI 
 
Table 21 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Fisher type test 
by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are stationary at 1st difference. The 
table 22 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999, 
2004), the results of four out of seven methods, (Panel PP-statistics, Panel ADF-statistic, Group 
PP-statistic and Group ADF-Statistic) are statistically significant. Table 23 shows the results of 
Panel FMOLS (Full Modified Ordinary Least Square), Coefficient values indicate long-run 
coefficients. P-values are significant at 1% significance level. As DCP has positive sign so, one-
unit increase in DCP reveals a gain in Corruption index of 0.01101 units. People of private sector 
try to pull maximum credit towards them in order to get extra benefits, so more credit usually 
results in more doubtful activities. The table 24 shows the coefficient and p-values of ECT (Error 
Correction Term). A negative sign of coefficient shows the convergence of DCP towards 
equilibrium. DCP convergence (get back) towards CPI at the speed of 4.82% annually as the data 
include is on an annual basis. Table 25 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin-Lin-Chu 
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(2002) and Fisher type tests by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are 
stationary at 1st difference. The table 26 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration 
test given by Pedroni (1999, 2004). All the results are statistically significant. So, the study found 
long-run relationship between variables. Table 27 shows results of Panel FMOLS (Fully Modified 
Ordinary Least Square). The results show that one-unit increase in HDI shows an increase in 
corruption index of 4.9028 units. When people are richer and aware, they spend more to get 
benefits, if not available easily on a legal basis. The table 28 shows p-values of ECT (Error 
Correction Term). A negative sign of the coefficient indicates a convergence of HDI towards 
equilibrium. HDI converges (get back) towards CPI at the speed of 2.66% annually.  
 
Table 29 shows the t-statistics and p-values given by Levin –Lin- Chu (2001) and Fisher type by 
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). All the variables are stationary at 1st difference. The 
table 30 shows the results of Residual based Panel Co-integration test given by Pedroni (1999, 
2004). The results of four out of seven methods (Panel PP-statistic, Panel ADF- Statistic, Group 
PP-statistic, and Group ADF-Statistic) are statistically significant. Table 31 shows the results of 
Panel FMOLS (Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square). Coefficient values indicate long-run 
relationship. P-values of BUR, DEMO and POLSTB are significant. One-unit increase in BUR 
and POLSTB drop the corruption level of 0.2875 units and 1.4290 units respectively due to their 
negative signs. DEMO affects corruption positively by 1.8782 units as it has positive sign with 
coefficient. It affects corruption negatively by 1.4318 units, but insignificantly. The increased 
amount of bureaucracy, more stable politicians and a perfect law and order condition often put 
pressure to overcome malfunctioned activities, but more democracy where everything becomes 
open, some hidden doubtful activities always run. The table 32 shows the statistics, Coefficient 
and the p-values of ECT Error Correction Term). The study settles the presence of a short-run 
relationship between CPI-BUR, CPI-DEMO, CPI-POLSTB and CPI-RLW. A negative sign of 
coefficients shows convergence towards equilibrium. 
• BUR convergence toward CPI at the speed of 11.07% annually. 
• DEMO converges toward CPI at the speed of 5.8% annually. 
• POLSTB converge toward CPI at the speed of 5.65% annually. 
• RLW converges towards CPI at the speed of 10.07% annually. 
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Conclusions and Policy Suggestions  
This study focused on the impacts of Development (Economic, Financial, Human, and Political) 
on corruption. It examined this relationship by using 20 years’ data from a sample of two panels 
of 49 Developing and 31 Developed countries. The main objective was to discover a long-term 
connection and short-run dynamics between variables. At first, a thorough literature has been 
reviewed on the relationship of Economic Development and Corruption, Financial Development 
and Corruption, Human Development and Corruption respectively. As a result of the discussion, 
a detailed econometric methodology has been established to be used in this particular study. 
Corruption Perception Index was used as regressand to measure Corruption. Regressors were 
classified into four categories. For Economic Development GDP per capita, Ratio of Exports of 
Goods and Services to GDP, Ratio of Imports of Goods and Services to GDP has been used. For 
Financial Development, ratio of Domestic Credit to Private Sectors to GDP was employed. Human 
Development is measured by Human Development Index and for Political Development, 
Government Effectiveness as a proxy of Bureaucracy, Voice, and Accountability as a proxy of 
Democracy, Political Stability and Rule of Law was used. Stationarity has been tested to emit 
spurious results, with the help of three main tests named Levin-Lin-Chu (2002), Fisher- ADF BY 
Maddals and Wu (1999) and Fisher-PP by Choi (2001). All variables were stationary at the first 
difference, therefore, long-term relationship was examined by using Pedroni (1999) Residual 
Based Panel Co-integration Test. After accomplishing long-run connection among variables, co-
integration coefficient has been estimated through Panel FMOLS technique, and the results 
implied that all Development variables have a significant impact on Corruption except Political 
Stability in case of Developed Panel and Bureaucracy in case of Developing Panel. Lastly, the 
speed of adjustment and short-term association has been tested by applying Panel VECM and the 
results established that Short-run dynamics exist between EXP, IMP, BUR DEMO, POLSTB, 
RLW and CPI in developed countries. Whereas in developing countries, all variables have a short-
run relationship with corruption expect GDP per capita. 
 
Some policy suggestions with the point of view of Corruption and Development relationship have 
been inferred from this study, which include: Policy makers must simplify the imports and export 
procedures. It will help reduce the practice of bribes to get their matters resolves quickly. 
Government should take steps to not only increase the income of people, but also to improve their 
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standard of living in other aspects of life especially in Developing countries. Credit availability to 
the public sector should also be made available on easy terms similar to that of the private sector. 
But the policies and check & balance system in both cases should be strict. Along with improved 
standards of living, people should be served without discrimination. It can also help reduce the 
bribes. There should be improvement in the political system. Democracy is helpful to get rid of 
Corruption but more openness and strictness in a democracy can be harmful sometimes, so careful 
steps should be taken by the Governments. 
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root: 
                                                                     At Level                             At 1st Difference 
Variables 
 
CPI 
 
 
EXP 
 
 
GDPpc 
 
 
IMP 
Methods 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Statistic  
-1.338* 
44.229 
39.592 
4.686 
13.996 
11.717 
14.402 
13.571 
1.920 
4.0913 
13.650 
12.030 
p-value 
(0.090) 
(0.957) 
(0.988) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
Statistic  
-20.582*** 
446.70*** 
493.53*** 
-20.548*** 
453.36*** 
448.76*** 
-8.4583*** 
163.155*** 
353.268** 
-24.063*** 
542.063*** 
550.725*** 
p-value 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
t* shows the t-statistic given by Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and (χ2)* shows the Chi-square statistic given by Fisher-ADF 
and Fisher-PP. *, ** and *** are to show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Table 2: Panel Co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Technique                 t-statistic 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
0.609 
(0.271) 
0.140 
(0.556) 
-3.674*** 
(0.0001 
-3.246*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
  - 
  - 
  - 
Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
Group PP-statistic  
Group ADF-statistic 
   - 
 
   - 
 
2.534 
(0.994) 
-3.588*** 
(0.000) 
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   - -3.390*** 
(0.000) 
Table 3: The Results of FMOLS 
Variables  Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
EXP 
GDP pc 
IMP 
-0.075 
9.2E-05 
0.169 
[-4.192]*** 
[7.518]*** 
[8.412]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 4: The results of  VECM 
Variables  Coefficient t-statistic  p-value 
EXP 
GDPpc 
IMP 
-0.075 
9.26-05 
0.169 
[-4.359]*** 
[7.518]*** 
[8.412]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.290) 
(0.000) 
Table 5: Panel Unit Root 
Variables Methods t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
 
CPI 
 
 
DCP 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
-1.338* 
44.229 
39.592 
6.687 
13.526 
12.519 
(0.090) 
(0.957) 
(0.988) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
-20.582*** 
446.70*** 
493.53*** 
13.812*** 
310.48*** 
331.39*** 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
Table 6: Panel co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
1.147 
(0.125) 
-1.527* 
(0.063) 
-3.450*** 
(0.000) 
-3.959*** 
(0.000) 
  - 
  - 
  - 
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Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   - 
 
   - 
 
   - 
-0.312 
(0.377) 
-2.861*** 
(0.002) 
-4.640*** 
(0.000) 
Table 7: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
DCP 0.071 [43.786]*** (0.000) 
Table 8: The results of VECM 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ECT DCP -0.007 [-1.150] (0.250) 
Table 9: Panel Unit Root 
Variables Methods t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
 
CPI 
 
HDI 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
-1.338* 
44.229 
39.592 
-0.886 
33.984 
34.663 
(0.090) 
(0.957) 
(0.988) 
(0.187) 
(0.998) 
(0.998) 
-20.582*** 
446.70*** 
493.53*** 
-47446*** 
668.91*** 
623.19*** 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
Table 10: Panel Co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
3.312*** 
(0.000) 
-4.242* 
(0.000) 
-5.163*** 
(0.000) 
-6.073*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
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Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   - 
 
   - 
 
   - 
-3.319** 
(0.000) 
-7.681*** 
(0.000) 
-8.264*** 
(0.000) 
Table 11: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
HDI 7.816 [226.586]*** (0.000) 
Table 12: The results of VECM 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ECT HDI 0.004 [1.566] (0.117) 
Table 13:    Panel Unit test 
                                                                     At Level                             At 1st Difference 
Variables 
 
CPI 
 
BUR 
 
 
DEMO 
 
 
POLSTB 
 
 
RLW 
Methods 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Statistic  
-1.338* 
44.229 
39.592 
-2.265 
48.715 
52.367 
-0.2399 
40.054 
54.664 
-2.430 
64.044 
73.313 
3.1973 
27.354 
38.395 
p-value 
(0.090) 
(0.957) 
(0.988) 
(0.011) 
(0.890) 
(0.803) 
(0.405) 
(0.986) 
(0.734) 
(0.007) 
(0.404) 
(0.154) 
(0.999) 
(1.000) 
90.992) 
Statistic  
-20.582*** 
446.70*** 
493.53** 
-27.868*** 
566.017** 
652.906*** 
-30.350*** 
613.52*** 
668.75*** 
-33.018*** 
639.70*** 
714.30*** 
-28.339*** 
572.28*** 
629.14*** 
p-value 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
(0.0000) 
Table 14:   Panel co-integration 
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Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
-2.031*** 
(0.978) 
0.712* 
(0.762) 
-4.158*** 
(0.000) 
-3.408*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 
 
Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   - 
 
   - 
 
   - 
2.491** 
(0.993) 
-5.805*** 
(0.000) 
-4.857*** 
(0.000) 
Table 15: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
BUR 
DEMO 
POLSTB 
RLW 
I.613 
2.653 
-0.124 
0.687 
[7.911]*** 
[11.006]*** 
[-0.743] 
[2.543]** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.457) 
(0.011) 
Table 16: The results of VECM 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
ECT 
BUR 
DEMO 
POLSTB 
RLW 
-0.098 
-0.033 
-0.039 
-0.074 
[-5.502]*** 
[-4.651]*** 
[-5.407]*** 
[-5.445]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 17:   Panel Unit Root 
                                                                     At Level                             At 1st Difference 
Variables Methods Statistic  p-value Statistic  p-value 
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CPI 
 
EXP 
 
 
GDPpc 
 
 
IMP 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
1.700 
43.043 
41.917 
0.578 
55.893 
52.000 
13.920 
35.115 
13.456 
0.250 
53.027 
48.167 
(0.955) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(0.718) 
(0.999) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(0.598) 
(0.999) 
(1.000) 
-33.00*** 
907.57*** 
967.29*** 
-29.86*** 
838.39** 
876.56*** 
-6.88*** 
326.10*** 
523.07*** 
-29.88*** 
841.87*** 
898.08*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 18: Panel Co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
-2.881 
(0.9980) 
0.690 
(0.755) 
-3.324*** 
(0.000) 
-3.973*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 
 
Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   - 
 
   - 
 
   - 
2.835 
(0.997) 
-4.283*** 
(0.000) 
-4.869*** 
(0.000) 
Table 19: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
EXP 0.027 [3.226]*** (0.000) 
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GDPpc 
IMP 
0.000 
0.054 
[5.863]*** 
[6.696]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 20: The results of VECM 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
ECT 
EXP 
GDPpc 
IMP 
-0.044 
-0.000 
-0.046 
[-4.541]*** 
[0.033] 
[-4.653]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.738) 
(0.000) 
Table 21: Panel Unit Root 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ECT HDI 0.004 [1.566] (0.117) 
Table 22: Panel Co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
-3.726 
(0.999) 
-0.513 
(0.001) 
-3.040*** 
(0.001) 
-2.893*** 
(0.001) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 
 
Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   
 
   - 
 
   - 
2.424 
(0.992) 
-3.943*** 
(0.000) 
-4.865*** 
(0.000) 
Table 23: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
DCP 0.110 [54.135]*** (0.000) 
 
Table 24: The results of VECM 
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 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ECT DCP -0.048 [-4.675]*** (0.000) 
Table 25:   Panel Unit Root 
Variables Methods t-statistic p-value  t-statistic p-value 
 
CPI 
 
HDI 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
1.700 
43.041 
41.917 
0.913 
38.356 
38.745 
(0.955) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(0.819) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
-33.086*** 
907.57*** 
967.29*** 
-28.765*** 
763.37*** 
1000.67*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 26:    Panel Co-Integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
4.414*** 
(0.000) 
-7.186*** 
(0.000) 
-7.205*** 
(0.000) 
-6.709*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 
 
Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
Group p-statistic 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
   
 
   - 
 
   - 
-3.162*** 
(0.000) 
-8.293*** 
(0.000) 
-7.862*** 
(0.000) 
Table 2: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
HDI 4.902 [155.467]*** (0.000) 
Table 28: the results of VECM 
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 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ECT HDI -0.026 [-3.026]*** (0.002) 
Table 29: Panel Unit Root 
                                                                     At Level                             At 1st Difference 
Variables 
 
CPI 
 
BUR 
 
 
DEMO 
 
 
POLSTB 
 
 
RLW 
Methods 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Levin-Lin-Chu (t*) 
Fisher-ADF (χ2)* 
Fisher-PP (χ2)* 
Statistic  
1.700 
43.043 
41.917 
-1.858 
131.90 
128.59 
-1.761 
158.86 
141.04 
-2.276 
144.54 
157.14 
-3.529 
135.21 
134.40 
p-value 
(0.955) 
(1.000) 
(1.000) 
(0.315) 
(1.000) 
(0.802) 
(0.457) 
(0.994) 
(0.298) 
(0.998) 
(1.000) 
(0.788) 
(0.459) 
(0.983) 
(0.879) 
Statistic  
-33.08*** 
907.57*** 
967.29*** 
-35.49*** 
893.47*** 
1048.57*** 
-36.34*** 
863.90*** 
1121.26*** 
-40.97*** 
985.81** 
1071.06*** 
-37.82*** 
965.59*** 
1045.11*** 
p-value 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 30: Panel Co-integration 
Alternative Hypothesis        Techniques                 t-statistic 
 
 
 
Common AR Coefficients 
“within-dimension” 
Panel v-statistic 
 
Panel p-statistic 
 
Panel PP-statistic 
 
Panel ADF-statistic 
-1.242 
(0.893) 
1.783 
(0.962) 
-4.860*** 
(0.000) 
-6.006*** 
(0.000) 
   - 
 
  - 
 
  - 
 Group p-statistic    4.160 
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Individual AR Coefficients 
“between-dimension” 
 
Group PP-statistic  
 
Group ADF-statistic 
 
   - 
 
   - 
(1.000) 
-5.374*** 
(0.000) 
-6.673*** 
(0.000) 
Table 31: The results of FMOLS 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
BUR 
DEMO 
POLSTB 
RLW 
-0.28 
  1.87 
-1.42 
-1.43 
[-1.349] 
[12.569]*** 
[-3.843]*** 
[-7.877]*** 
(0.177) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
Table 32: The results of VECM 
 Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
ECT 
BUR 
DEMO 
POLSTB 
RLW 
-0.110 
-0.058 
-0.056 
-0.100 
[-6.808]*** 
[-5.103]*** 
[-4.783]*** 
[-6.423]*** 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
 
